Judicial Attempts at Uniform Divorce Policy by Martin, Virginia L.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 9 | Number 4
May 1949
Judicial Attempts at Uniform Divorce Policy
Virginia L. Martin
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Virginia L. Martin, Judicial Attempts at Uniform Divorce Policy, 9 La. L. Rev. (1949)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol9/iss4/6
COMMENTS
the expiration of the three judicial days allowed for moving for
a rehearing.
4. If the judgment is signed prior to the disposition of timely
motions for new trial or rehearing, and these motions are not
disposed of until after the third judicial day, the "effective date"
of the signature is the date of the disposition of such motions.
5. With the exception of the two instances provided for in
Article 543,86 the delays allowed for motions for new trial and
rehearing are computed from the date of the rendition of the
judgment.37
GEORGE W. PUGH
JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS AT UNIFORM DIVORCE POLICY
Divorce is an omnipresent fact which cannot be ignored.
From the legal viewpoint, a problem arises when 'a state is forced
to recognize the divorce of a sister state which contravenes the
public policy of the recognizing state. At first glance it might
seem that this is an unwarranted projection of the policies of one
state, which has lenient divorce laws, into a sister state where
divorce is virtually impossible. Yet, irrespective of the facility
with which the divorce is obtained, if that divorce is not recog-
nized everywhere, there results a dangerous instability in per-
sonal status and its incidents. In recent years the United States
Supreme Court has expanded the area in which recognition of
divorce decrees is required until with its latest pronouncement
on the subject-that where there has been opportunity to litigate
the jurisdictional issue of domicile, the recognizing state must
give full faith and credit, without itself inquiring into the juris-
dictional issue-it may have penetrated too deeply to extricate
itself with grace.'
36. La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 302 of 1942.
37. It has already been explained that although this article mentions
only new trial, it is believed that it would be interpreted to include the delays
for both new trial and rehearing.
1. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948);
Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 68 S.Ct. 1094, 92 L.Ed. 1451 (1948). For a discussion
of these cases, see Carey and MacChesney, Divorces by the Consent of the
Parties and Divisible Divorce Decrees (1948) 43 Ill. L. Rev. 608; Merrill,
The Utility of Divorce Recognition Statutes in Dealing with the Problem
of Migratory Divorce (1949) 27 Texas L. Rev. 293; Reese and Johnson, The
Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments (1949) 49 Col. L. Rev. 153;
Notes (1948) 15 Brooklyn L. Rev. 165; (1948) 23 Tulane L. Rev. 269; (1948)
1 Okla. L. Rev. 287; (1949) 14 Mo. L. Rev. 103; Paulsen, Migratory Divorce:
Chapters III and IV (1948) 24 Indiana L.J. 25.
See also Rice v. Rice, 9 C.C.H., U.S.S.C. Bull. 1253, No. 117 (April 18,
1949).
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In order to arrive at a just and workable solution, it is of
compelling import that there be an awareness of the interests
involved. In the last analysis the interests of the individual
should be in harmony with the public policies espoused by the
state, for it is the state's purpose to function for the general wel-
fare of its citizenry.
Certainly, all concerned-the individual parties, the state
with the difficult divorce laws, and the state with the less string-
ent laws-affirm the need for uniformity in divorce status. Such
uniformity would render certain the status of the children of the
marriage and of the parties who remarry in reliance on the di-
vorce.
But here the harmony ends. Parties who are seeking divorce,
although desiring a valid divorce entitled to recognition, seldom
have inhibitions as to its procurement. Where money is no ob-
stacle, the speediest procedure is the most popular. If the suit is
uncontested by the other spouse, a consent decree in effect is
obtained.
The conflict among the states stems from the wide extremes
in divorce laws,2 which are a reflection of differences in public
policy. Should a state whose public policy is opposed to granting
divorces for convenience be forced to recognize a divorce granted
by a sister state where the plaintiff spouse is a mere resident of
ninety days? Should a state be forced to recognize a consent de-
cree granted upon personal appearance of both parties at the
domicile of neither? Should a state be precluded from collaterally
attacking a divorce decree simply because the parties themselves
are bound by res judicata? Should other interested third parties
(e.g., a second spouse) be allowed to attack the validity of a
foreign divorce judgment, which the spouses themselves would
be precluded from attacking?
Marriage is more than just a civil contract. It is the marriage
status more than any other that creates the basic pattern of our
society. The state has an interest which is more vital than that
of any single individual. For this reason laws are passed regulat-
ing marriage and divorce, just as laws are passed prohibiting
any contract which violates public policy.3
2. South Carolina allows no absolute divorce and New York only for
adultery. Most states either allow divorce only for very restricted causes
or require a fairly long residence. However, Idaho and Nevada require only
six weeks; Arkansas and Wyoming, sixty days; and Florida, ninety days.
For more complete statistics, see Ireland and Galindez, Divorce in the Amer-
icas (1947) and Mackay, Marriage and Divorce Law Simplified (1940).
3. See the discussion of Mr. Justice Field in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S.
[VOL. IX
COMMENTS
It is the aim of this comment to harmonize these superficially
conflicting interests without doing violence to traditional con-
cepts of public policy by attempting to show (1) that a divorce
is an in rem and not an in personam proceeding, (2) that the
doctrine of res judicata is not applicable in an in rem proceeding
where the adjudicating court actually had no jurisdiction of the
res, (3) that if res judicata is applied and, on the basis of that
doctrine, full faith and credit required, as in the cases of Coe, v.
Coe4 and Sherrer v. Sherrer,5 the decision of the recognizing state
is open to attack under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Divorce Is an In Rem Proceeding
In an in personam action service of process is an essential
prerequisite since through such service the court acquires juris-
diction. With some few exceptions6 personal service on the de-
fendant is required within the state exercising jurisdiction, unless
such service is waived by the express consent or appearance of
the defendant.
In an in rem proceeding, it is not jurisdiction over the person
which is essential but jurisdiction over the res, obtained by hav-
ing the res within the control of the court. Personal service is
not necessary, and as long as reasonable measures are provided
through which the defendant would probably receive actual
notice of the pending suit, due process is met. It is elementary
that a judgment rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction is void,
whether the suit be one in personam or in rem.7
It has long been recognized that domicile is the jurisdic-
tional basis for a valid divorce proceeding. If the suit were
strictly in personam, the mere presence of the parties would be
sufficient to vest jurisdiction. Domicile would be unnecessary.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, although sometimes wavering
between the in personam and in rem theories or a rejection of
both, has consistently held domicile obligatory to confer juris-
diction in divorce cases.
190, 210, 8 S.Ct. 723, 729, 31 L.Ed. 654, 659 (1888). See also Mr. Justice
Murphy's dissent in Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287, 308, 63 S.Ct.
207, 217, 87 L.Ed. 279, 291 (1942).
4. 334 U.S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094, 92 L.Ed. 1451 (1948).
5. 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948).
6. E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927);
International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct.
154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945).
7. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877); Thompson v. Whit-
man, 85 U.S. 457, 21 L.Ed. 897 (1873).
1949]
518 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. IX
There must be a res for a proceeding to be in rem. In a di-
vorce proceeding it is the marital res, the status of the marriage
relation, that is before the court. In Williams v. North Carolina
III the Court flatly stated for the first time that a divorce action,
although possessing some in rem characteristics, is not a pro-
ceeding in rem. Nevertheless, until the Coe and Sherrer deci-
sions, no case was inconsistent with the view that a divorce is
an in rem proceeding in which the domicile of only one of the
parties places the marital res within the jurisdiction of the court.
This theory has been attacked on the ground that where the
parties are domiciled in separate states, each state has control
over one-half of the marital res. In such a case, it is argued, the
in rem theory would produce one of two undesirable results:
(1) Neither state could exercise jurisdiction since the entire res
is not before the court; 9 (2) actually only one state could exer-
cise jurisdiction, which theoretically both states possess through
their control of one-half the marital res.10 Although it is true
under the second argument that both states have jurisdiction
over the marriage status, and, therefore, the power to dissolve
it, once it has been dissolved there is nothing left for the other
to affect."
In Cheever v. Wilson' 2 the wife left the matrimonial domicile
in Washington and removed to Indiana, where the husband ap-
peared personally in a divorce suit brought by her. The validity
of this divorce was attacked collaterally and the Court, after
announcing that a wife may acquire a separate domicile when-
ever necessary and proper, upheld the divorce, saying that the
Indiana court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter.
This holding can be rationalized either on the in rem or in
personam theory. Because the husband appeared in the proceed-
ing, he waived personal service, and so the requirements for an
in personam action were met. The requirements for an in rem
action were also met, if it is accepted that the domicile of only
one of the parties places the marital res within the jurisdiction
of the court.
In Atherton v. Atherton13 the Court recognized as valid a
8. 325 U.S. 226, 232, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 1582 (1945).
9. Vreeland, Validity of Foreign Divorces (1938) particularly at 28.
10. Mr. Justice White in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 577, 26 S.Ct.
525, 530, 50 L.Ed. 867, 872 (1906).
11. Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce (1906) 19 Harv.
L. Rev. 586, 591.
12. 70 U.S. 108, 19 L.Ed. 604 (1869).
13. 181 U.S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544, 45 L.Ed. 794 (1901).
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Kentucky divorce which was awarded to the domiciliary husband
against the nonresident wife, who had not appeared. However,
the decision was expressly restricted to the facts at issue, that
is, a case in which the matrimonial domicile as well as the plain-
tiff's domicile is in the divorcing state. Although this suit could
conceivably be construed as one in personam on the theory that
the wife had not acquired a separate domicile when she was
forced to leave Kentucky because of the husband's misconduct,
and that service on her in New York by mail was sufficient, it
would be an awkward application of the concept.14 Apparently
the Court applied the in rem theory, although expressly recog-
nizing that it was not basing jurisdiction solely on the domicile
of the husband. Thus, without taking a positive stand, the Court
,considered the marital res before the court of the state in which
both plaintiff and defendant were theoretically domiciled under
the fiction of matrimonial domicile, but where only the plaintiff
was actually domiciled.
In Bell v. Bell' 5 and Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 6 where neither
plaintiff nor defendant was a domiciliary of the state in which
the divorce was sought, and where the defendant spouse had
been served only by mail outside the state, full faith and credit
was not required. These cases afford no positive support for either
theory, as the divorces there granted violate both the in personam
and in rem theories. There was no personal service of the de-
fendant spouse; there was no domicile of the plaintiff.
In Andrews v. Andrews17 the Court refused to uphold a
divorce obtained by the husband in South Dakota, which state
was neither his domicile nor the matrimonial domicile, although
the wife appeared in the proceeding through counsel. Consent of
both parties could not confer jurisdiction over the subject matter
any more than could the consent of one party ii the Bell and
Streitwclf cases.'8 The basis of jurisdiction in the Andrews case
14. Although not expressly declaring that this was a proceeding strictly in
rem, the Court did recognize that this was not a suit in personam. "The rule
as to the notice necessary to give full effect to a decree of divorce is different
from that which is required in suits in personam." 181 U.S. 155, 162, 21 S.Ct.
544, 547, 45 L.Ed. 794, 799.
15. 181 U.S. 175, 21 S.Ct. 551, 45 L.Ed. 804 (1901).
16. 181 U.S. 179, 21 S.Ct. 553, 45 L.Ed. 807 (1901).
17. 188 U.S. 14, 23 S. Ct. 237, 47 L.Ed. 366 (1902).
18. Although this case was questioned in Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 68
S.Ct. 1094, 92 L.Ed. 1451 (1948) and Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct.
1087, 92 LEd. 1429 (1948), it was questioned not on the ground that it was an
in rem proceeding, but on the theory that where the defendant appears in
the proceedings, any issue upon which there is an opportunity to litigate is
res adjudicata and cannot be collaterally attacked in a subsequent proceed-
ing. This point will be discussed later.
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appears to be the marital res, although again this can be deduced
only negatively. However, it seems clear that if this were a suit
in personam, since the defendant appeared in the proceeding,
the South Dakota divorce would be valid and the question of
domicile of the plaintiff would be immaterial.
Haddock v. Haddock,", expressly overruled in Williams v.
North Carolina 1,20 had held invalid a divorce obtained by the
husband in Connecticut against the non-domiciliary wife where
there was no appearance and no personal service. The Court
distinguished the Atherton case on the ground that there the
divorcing state was also the state of matrimonial domicile. The
majority in the Haddock case had considered divorce as an in
personam proceeding. The four dissenting justices thought it an
in rem proceeding. 21 Since the Haddock case has been overruled,
the reasoning of the dissent should be re-examined.
Thompson v. Thompson,22 like the Atherton case, involved
a divorce obtained by the husband in the state of his domicile
and the matrimonial domicile. The decree was held valid, al-
though, again, the Court might be distinguishing this situation
by holding that the state of matrimonial domicile has jurisdic-
tion over the absent spouse, the case seems more readily explain-
able on the basis of the in rem theory-that the marital res was
before the court of the plaintiff's domicile.
Williams v. North Carolina I held that an ex parte divorce
decree granted to a Nevada domiciliary against a North Carolina
defendant was entitled to full faith and credit. Williams v. North
Carolina II made it clear that the recognizing state could itself
consider the question of domicile and refuse full faith and credit
where there had been no bona fide domicile. The court in the
first Williams case recognized that divorce proceedings are not
in personam,23 and in the second Williams case that they are not
in rem.241
19. 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867 (1906).
20. 317 U.S. 287, 304, 63 S.Ct. 207, 216, 87 L.Ed. 279, 289 (1942).
21. Mr. Justice Brown, with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr.
Justice Brewer, and Mr. Justice Holmes, 201 U.S. 562, 614, 26 S.Ct. 525, 546,
50 L.Ed. 867, 888 (1906).
22. 226 U.S. 551, 33 S.Ct, 129, 57 L.Ed. 347 (1913).
23. 317 U.S. 287, 298, 63 S.Ct. 207, 213, 87 L.Ed. 279, 286. "Hence the de-
crees in this case, like other divorce decrees, are more than in personam
judgments. They involve the marital status of the parties. Domicil creates
a relationship to the state which is adequate for numerous exercises of
state power."
24. 325 U.S. 226, 232, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 1582 (1945). "Al-
though it is now settled that a suit for divorce is not an ordinary adversary
proceeding, it does not promote analysis, as was recently pointed out, to
label divorce proceedings as actions in rem."
[VOL. IX
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This would seem to relegate divorce proceedings to some
sort of quasi zone, which the Court frequently employs as an
escape fiction, since in the second Williams case it is indicated
that divorce has some of the characteristics of an in rem pro-
ceeding. Since the thesis apparently has been accepted sub si-
lentio in all prior cases, that the domicile of one spouse is suf-
ficient to place control of the marital res in the courts of the
domiciliary state, there is no difficulty or incongruity in frankly
admitting that the divorce proceeding is in rem, and not in per-
sonam or quasi in rem. Such an admission would probably obvi-
ate any future difficulties arising with respect to the scope and
limitations of full faith and credit and res judicata, which of late
have engaged the Court in dialectical wizardry.25
Despite the Court's statement that the in rem label should
not be applied to divorce proceedings, Williams II presents no
inconsistency. Had there been actual domicile of the plaintiff,
the divorce would probably have been entitled to full faith and
credit even though there was no appearance and no personal
service of the defendant.
When an In Rem Proceeding Is an Exception to Res Judicata
If the conclusion can be accepted that the divorce action is
to be treated as one in rem and not in personam, the sequel ques-
tion is obvious. Is the doctrine of res judicata applicable to an in
rem proceeding where the court adjudicating actually had no
jurisdiction of the res?26
25. See Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 68 S.Ct. 1094, 92 L.Ed. 1451 (1948) and
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948). This
point is discussed infra p. 522.
26. Actually all that the Court decided in the Coe and Sjherrer cases
was that only the parties to the suit were bound by the res judicata doc-
trine. The question remains open as to whether third parties, including the
state, will also be brought within this rule. The confusion in which the
Coe and Sherrer decisions leaves this aspect of the problem becomes appar-
ent from a consideration of two New York cases subsequently decided. In
both deMarigny v. deMarigny, 193 Misc. 189, 81 N.Y.S.(2d) 228 (1948), and
Bane v. Bane, 80 N.Y.S.(2d) 641 (1948) an out of state divorce was granted
in which both parties personally appeared and had full opportunity to con-
test the jurisdictional issues. Upon returning to New York the divorced
husband remarried, and his second wife sued to annul their marriage on the
ground that the divorce obtained against him by his first wife was invalid
on jurisdictional grounds. The contention was that the Coe and Sherrer
cases applied res judicata only between the parties and the rule was not
controlling when a collateral attack was made by a third party. The de-
Marigny case held that this action was not foreclosed on the basis of the
Coe and Sherrer cases, citing a formidable list of New York cases, and the
statement in the Williams case "that those not parties to a litigation ought
not to be foreclosed by the interested actions of others." The Bane case,
decided just thirteen days later, without referring to the deMarigny case,
took a contrary view, also citing a long list of New York cases.
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In June of 1948 the United States Supreme Court rendered
its decisions in the companion cases of Coe v. Coe and Sherrer
v. Sherrer. In both cases the defendant spouse personally ap-
peared; in the Sherrer case the issue of domicile was raised by
the pleadings; in the Coe case it was not; but in both there was
opportunity to litigate this issue. The Court held that under such
circumstances the state court's decision that it had jurisdiction
was res judicata, that "the doctrine of res judicata must be ap-
plied to questions of jurisdiction in cases arising in state courts
involving the application of the full faith and credit clause
where, under the law of the state in which the original judgment
was rendered, such adjudications are not susceptible to collateral
attack."27
Had there been no question of res judicata the Court would
probably have held, as in the Williams II case, that the jurisdic-
tional issue of domicile was open to collateral attack. If the ac-
tions were in personam, then certainly the doctrine of res judi-
cata would apply, since the court actually had jurisdiction by
virtue of the consent of the parties through appearance. How-
ever, if the actions were in rem, which all prior decisions would
indicate is the correct designation, then it is immaterial as far
as the validity of the judgment is concerned, whether the de-
fendants appeared, and whether they had an opportunity to liti-
gate the question of domicile. If jurisdiction in an in rem pro-
ceeding cannot be given by the consent of the plaintiff, as in the
Williams case, neither can it be given by the consent of both
spouses, which the Coe and Sherrer cases apparently allow.
An adjudication by a state court that it has jurisdiction can-
not give it jurisdiction which in actuality it has not. If there is
no actual domicile, the court has no jurisdiction; if the court has
no jurisdiction, the judgment is void; if the judgment is void
where rendered, it is not entitled to full faith and credit, irre-
spective of any doctrine of res judicata. And if the recognizing
state is precluded from questioning the jurisdiction of the divorc-
ing state, how can it ever be determined whether or not the
judgment is void?
Article IV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution2 8
requires that judicial proceedings in each state be given full
27. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 350, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1090, 92 L.Ed. 1429,
1436 (1948).
28. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Rec-
ords and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
[VOL. IX
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faith and credit in the courts of every other state. The Act of
May 26, 1790,29 declares that judicial proceedings authenticated
as there provided shall have such faith and credit given to them
in every "court within the United States as they have by law or
usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken."
This statute broadened the constitutional mandate so that full
faith and credit must b6 given to state judgments even in federal
courts.8
0
Full faith and credit is predicated only upon the existence of
a valid judgment. Therefore, it has been continuously recognized
that a sister state may inquire into the jurisdictional bases of
the court rendering the judgment, consistently with the require-
ments of full faith and credit.31
This is the point at which the res judicata principle comes
into conflict with the theory of full faith and credit. Numerous
cases have held that where an issue has been actually litigated,
or where there has been opportunity to litigate it, that issue is
res judicata in all other courts, and it is immaterial whether the
issue be jurisdictional or not.3 2
The Court incorporated this general rule in the Coe and
Sherrer cases and applied it to divorce cases with the result that
consent decrees are condoned and encouraged. Each of the cases
cited by the Court to sustain its position in the Coe and Sherrer
cases is distinguishable, and a correct legal decision could have
been reached, consistent with public policy and the full faith
and credit clause, without going logically astray. The following
cases were cited as precedent for the proposition that res judicata
is applicable insofar as cases originating in the federal courts are
concerned.
Since full faith and credit is applicable to federal as well as
state court judgments,33 no distinction can be made there.
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's AssociationM4 was an
action in personam, where the defendant had appeared to con-
test the jurisdictional issue. Surely, an in personam action, where
29. 1 Stat. 122, as amended (1790), 28 U.S.C.A. § 687.
30. Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481, 485, 3 L.Ed. 411, 413 (1813).
31. Ibid.; Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457, 21 L.Ed. 897 (1873).
32. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522, 51
S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134,
83 L.Ed. 104 (1938); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Company, 308 U.S. 66, 60
S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85 (1939).
33. Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640, 20 S.Ct. 506, 44 L.Ed.
619 (1899); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.(2d)
82, 139 A.L.R. 1 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1941).
34. 283 U.S. 522, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931).
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the defendant has at least appeared in court, is different from
an in rem proceeding where the res is not and has never been
within the control of the court.
Stoll v. Gottlieb35 was an in rem proceeding, in which the
jurisdictional fact in dispute revolved around the interpretation
of a statute, not the absence of the res. Can not a valid distinc-
tion be made between a fact which is strictly jurisdictional 6
and one which is only quasi-jurisdictional in nature?3 7 Chicot
County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank38 may be differ-
entiated on the same point as Stoll v. Gottlieb.f
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company v. Adkins 40 applied res
judicata to a determination by a federal administrative agency,
which was all that could be done under the dictates of the gov-
erning statute.41 Certainly, this does not sustain the application
of the doctrine in the Coe and Sherrer cases.
In Jackson v. Irving Trust Company42 the point which was
held res judicata was the definition of the word "enemy" in "The
Trading with the Enemy Act,' 43 which is apparently a quasi-
jurisdictional and not a purely jurisdictional determination.
35. 305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed. 104 (1938). This case involved the
reorganization of a bankrupt in which the federal district court released a
guarantor, who was present at the proceedings, from his guaranty on a bond.
Later one of the bondholders, who had received notice but had not appeared,
unsuccessfully petitioned the Court to set aside the order on the ground
that it had not had jurisdiction under the federal bankruptcy statute.
36. As would be the case where there is no service or waiver or consent
in an in personam proceeding, and no control over the res in an in rem
proceeding. The Court, however, did indicate in dicta that this would be
immaterial. "That determination is res judicata of that issue in this action,
whether or not power to deal with the particular subject-matter was strictly
or quasi-jurisdictional." 305 U.S. 165, 177, 59 S.Ct. 134, 140, 83 L.Ed. 104, 111
(1938).
37. See note 61, infra.
38. 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940). This case involved the
reorganization of a bankrupt drainage district in the federal district court,
in which proceedings the respondent bondholders had appeared and had
opportunity to litigate the jurisdictional question. There was no actual liti-
gation on the point, since at that time no part of the federal bankruptcy
act had been declared unconstitutional; whereas at the time of the second
suit contesting the jurisdictional point, it had; this, in fact, being the very
bone of contention.
39. In order to determine whether it had jurisdiction the federal district
court inquired into the scope of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. 52
Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 (1938).
40. 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940). The Bituminous Coal
Commission determined that a producer's coal was "bituminous" within
the meaning of the Bituminous Coal Act, thus subjecting him to the 19%'%
sales tax. The producer challenged the jurisdiction of the Commission in
a suit in the federal district court to enjoin collection of the tax.
41. Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 75 (1937), 15 U.S.C.A. § 828 (1937).
42. 311 U.S. 494, 61 S.Ct. 326, 85 LEd. 297 (1941).
43. 40 Stat. 411, 419 (1917), as amended, 42 Stat. 1511 (1923), 50 U.S.C.A.
app. § 9(a).
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Heiser v. Woodruff44 was an in personam judgment in which
the defendant had appeared to contest jurisdiction. This dis-
tinguishes it from the Coe and Sherrer cases.
The last case cited by the Supreme Court to sustain its
proposition was Forsyth v. Hammond.45 This decision is more
nearly in point but is distinguishable since it does not rest solely
on the doctrine of res judicata. Under an Indiana statute plain-
tiff's land had been annexed as part of the City of Hammond.
This action was affirmed by the trial court and again upon ap-
peal by the Indiana Supreme Court, which refused to sustain the
contention of the plaintiff that this was a legislative, not a ju-
dicial matter, and that the courts had no jurisdiction to enter-
tain the suit. When city taxes were assessed against the plain-
tiff, she applied to the United States District Court, on the ground
of diversity of citizenship, for an injunction and again pleaded
the jurisdictional question. Without any inquiry into the juris-
diction, the Court foreclosed further argument with the bar of
res judicata. It should be noted that this case did not involve
any fundamental jurisdictional elements but only the interpre-
tation of a state statute. Aside from the res judicata argument,
the Court's decision rested on another established rule, which
was decisive. The Court said: "The matter in controversy is one
peculiarly within the domain of state control. . . .The construc-
tion by the courts of a State of its constitution and statutes is,
as a general rule, binding on the Federal courts. We may think
that the Supreme Court of a State has misconstrued its constitu-
tion or its statutes, but we are not at liberty to therefore set aside
its judgments. '46
The preceding discussion indicates that there are differenti-
ating factors between the cases cited and the Coe and Sherrer
cases. The Court in the Sherrer case then proceeded to cite cases
purporting to sustain the application of res judicata to state
court judgments. 47
44. 327 U.S. 726, 66 S.Ct. 853, 90 L.Ed. 970 (1946). Petitioner had reduced
his creditor's claim to judgment in a prior suit in the federal district court,
in which suit respondent had appeared and contested the jurisdiction of the
court on the ground that there had been no valid service of process. After the
respondent was adjudicated bankrupt the petitioner filed suit in the federal
district court to recover the debt on the basis of his judgment, and the
jurisdictional question, which the respondent again attempted to raise, was
declared res judicata.
45. 166 U.S. 506, 17 S.Ct. 665, 41 L.Ed. 1095 (1897).
46. 166 U.S. 506, 518, 17 S.Ct. 665, 670, 41 L.Ed. 1095, 1100.
47. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S.Ct. 3, 83 L.Ed. 26, 118 A.L.R. 1518
(1938); American Surety Company v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 53 S.Ct. 98, 77
L.Ed. 231, 86 A.L.R. 298 (1932); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Company, 308
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Of these cases the most difficult to distinguish is Davis v.
Davis.48 The Court held the wife bound by the determination of
the Virginia court that it had jurisdiction where the wife had
personally appeared in the proceeding and challenged the domi-
cile of the husband. The Court, however, did not specifically
predicate its decision on res judicata. Furthermore, it added:
"Nor can it be said that the domicile was not adequate to sup-
port, in virtue of the rule of full faith and credit established by
Congress, a decree enforceable in the courts of the District of
Columbia. '49 This statement recognizes that there actually was
domicile, and that the decision that the wife was bound by the
former adjudication in no way conflicted with the full faith and
credit clause. Is not this an adequate point of distinction?
American Surety Company v. Baldwin0 was an action in a
state court against a surety on a supersedeas bond, in which the
defendant appeared to contest the jurisdiction on the ground
that no notice had been given him. On certiorari to the Supreme
Court the jurisdictional determination was held res judicata. It
is important to note that this was an in personam, not an in rem,
proceeding, and one in which the defendant had actually ap-
peared. Certainly a situation like this, in which the defendant
waives notice, at least insofar as his special appearance to con-
test jurisdiction is concerned, is different from an in rem pro-
ceeding. Since the basis of in personam jurisdiction is valid
service of process on the defendant, or an appearance which
constitutes a waiver of such service, even where the defendant
appears specially to contest jurisdiction it is at least a consent
to have the court determine the jurisdictional question.5' But
in an in rem proceeding, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by ap-
pearance or consent of the defendant, since this does not confer
jurisdiction over the res, which is essential.
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Company52 seems to refute more
than to sustain the proposition articulated by the Court that res
judicata must be applied to jurisdictional questions between the
sister states. This case involved the ownership of stock belong-
ing to the estate of the deceased. The superior court of Washing-
U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85 (1939); Chicago Life Insurance Company v.
Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 37 $.Ct. 492, 61 L.Ed. 966 (1917).
48. 305 U.S. 32, 59 S.Ct. 3, 83 L.Ed. 26 (1938).
49. 305 U.S. 32, 41. 59 S.Ct. 3, 6, 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 (1938).
50. 287 U.S. 156, 53 S.Ct. 98, 77 L.Ed. 231, 86 A.L.R. 298 (1932).
51. See Medina, Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction (1931) 31 Col.
L. Rev. 238, 259. See also Farrier, Full Faith and Credit of Adjudication of
Jurisdictional Facts (1935) 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 552, 571.
52. 308 U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85 (1939).
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ton awarded this stock to Pelkes, assignor of Treinies. The ques-
tion of jurisdiction was actually litigated when Mrs. Mason, an
Idaho domiciliary and the other claimant of the stock, applied
to the Washington Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to
issue to the lower court for lack of jurisdiction, and was refused.
Mrs. Mason had previously brought suit in the Idaho district
court, which court, in proceeding to judgment after the Wash-
ington action, determined that the Washington court had not
had jurisdiction and declared Mrs. Mason to be the owner of the
stock. The Washington judgment was pleaded in bar. The Sun-
shine Mining Company, whose stock was in contest, then brought
this bill of interpleader in the federal district court in Idaho,
and Pelkes again pleaded the Washington judgment in bar. The
United States Supreme Court held that the decree of the Idaho
district court that the Washington court did not have jurisdic-
tion was res judicata and binding on the federal court. But as to
the right of the Idaho court to make this determination concern-
ing its sister state, the Court said in dicta:
"The effectiveness of the Washington judgment as a bar
depended upon whether the court which rendered it had juris-
diction after an order of distribution, to deal with settlements
of distributees with respect to the assets of an estate. On con-
sideration it was determined in the Idaho proceeding that the
Washington court did not have this jurisdiction and that the
stock of the mining company became the property of Mrs.
Mason. In declining to give effect to the Washington decree for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Idaho court de-
termined also the basic question raised by petitioner in the in-
terpleader action. The contention of petitioner in the interpleader
proceeding that the Idaho court did not have jurisdiction of the
stock controversy because that controversy was in the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Washington probate court must fall because
of the Idaho decision that the Washington probate court did not
have exclusive jurisdiction. This is true even though the ques-
tion of the Washington jurisdiction had been actually litigated
and decided in favor of Pelkes in the Washington proceeding."'5 3
(Italics supplied.)
This declaration supports the view that even where the jur-
isdictional question was actually litigated a sister state may
inquire into the question of jurisdiction before giving full faith
and credit.
53. 308 U.S. 66, 76, 60 S.Ct. 44, 50, 84 L.Ed. 85, 92 (1939).
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Nor does Chicago Life Insurance Company v. Cherry,54 the
last case cited by the Court in the Sherrer decision, sustain its
statement. This was an in personam action in Tennessee to re-
cover against an insurance company. The contention that there
was no jurisdiction because there was no valid service of pro-
cess was argued by the defendant in the Tennessee court. When
the plaintiffs attempted to recover on this judgment in the Il-
linois court, the determination of this question was held res
judicata. The defendant appealed to the United States Supreme
Court on the ground that this was a denial of due process. It did
not decide that full faith and credit must be given on the basis
of the jurisdictional point being res judicata. This was not at
issue, since the Illinois court had not refused to recognize the
Tennessee decree. The Court said in dicta: "If the Tennessee
judgment had been declared void in Illinois this court might
have been called upon to decide whether it had been given due
faith and credit."5 5 Furthermore, this case, upon which the Su-
preme Court relies as precedent in the Coe and Sherrer cases,
cited the Andrews case (which case is questioned in the Coe
and Sherrer decisions) with approval.56
It is submitted that the considerations which are pertinent
in determining the correct application of the doctrine of res
judicata are the following.
(1) Is there any well established doctrine or public policy
consideration other than res judicata that might carry as much
or more weight with the court? 7
(2) Is not the public policy of the state in divorce and other
status cases stronger than in other types of cases?5 8
(3) Is a proceeding in personam involved, where the de-
fendant has made a special appearance to contest the jurisdic-
tion, or a proceeding in rem?5 9
54. 244 U.S. 25, 37 S.Ct. 492, 61 L.Ed. 966 (1917).
55. 244 U.S. 25, 30, 37 S.Ct. 492, 493, 61 L.Ed. 966, 969 (1917).
56. 244 U.S. 25, 29, 37 S.Ct. 492, 493, 61 LEd. 966, 969 (1917).
57. See Forsythe v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 17 S.Ct. 665, 41 LEd. 1095
(1897), where the Court also relied on the rule that a state court's interpre-
tation of its statutes is binding on the federal courts. See also Davis v.
Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 59 S.Ct. 3, 83 L.Ed. 26 (1938), where the Court recognized
that there was sufficient domicile and no conflict with the full faith and
credit clause.
58. See the discussion on public policy, supra p. 516.
59. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522, 51
S.Ct. 417, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 66 S.Ct. 853,
90 L.Ed. 970 (1946); American Surety Company v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 53
S.Ct. 98, 77 L.Ed. 231 (1932); Chicago Life Insurance Company v. Cherry,
244 U.S. 25, 37 S.Ct. 492, 61 L.Ed. 966 (1917). There are several United States
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(4) Is the doctrine being applied to strictly jurisdictional
facts or quasi-jurisdictional facts?60
(5) Could these circumstances be considered an exception
to the res judicata doctrine? 61
The Due Process Whip in Divorce
When the principle of res judicata is applied to fundamental
jurisdictional facts in an in rem proceeding, does this not result
in a deprivation of property without due process of law under
the Fourteenth Amendment? The resulting dilemma is serious-
if the state refuses to recognize the judgment, it is violating the
Supreme Court cases, involving an in rem proceeding, where the defendant
was either validly served or appeared, that refuse to apply the doctrine of
res judicata to jurisdictional questions. See Valley v. Northern Fire & Ma-
rine Insurance Company, 254 U.S. 347, 41 S.Ct. 116, 65 L.Ed. 297 (1920), where
after service of process, an insurance company was adjudged bankrupt in
an involuntary proceeding in the federal district court in a default judgment.
The defendant later questioned the jurisdiction of the Court in the form of
a petition to revise in the circuit court of appeals. The Supreme Court
said, "Courts are constituted by authority and they can not go beyond that
authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders
are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this
even prior to reversal. . . . If consent can confirm jurisdiction, why not
initially confer jurisdiction?" 254 U.S. 347, 353, 354, 356, 41 S.Ct. 116, 65 L.Ed.
297. See also Bank of Jasper v. First National Bank of Rome, Georgia,
258 U.S. 112, 42 S.Ct. 202, 66 L.Ed. 490 (1922), discussed infra p. 531.
60. See Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147 U.S. 165, 13 S.Ct.
271, 37 L.Ed. 123 (1892), which makes this distinction. Strictly jurisdictional
facts are those whose existence is necessary to the validity of the proceedings
and without which the act of the court is null, for example, service of pro-
cess on the defendant in an in personam proceeding (where there is no
waiver or consent) or control of the res in proceedings in rem. Quasi juris-
dictional facts are those "which are necessary to be alleged and proved in
order to set the machinery of the law in motion, but which, when properly
alleged and established to the satisfaction of the court, cannot be attacked
collaterally. With respect to these facts, the finding of the court is as con-
clusively presumed to be correct as its findings with respect to any other
matter in issue between the parties. Examples of these are the allegations
and proof of the requisite diversity of citizenship, or the amount in contro-
versy in a federal court, which, when found by such court, cannot be ques-
tioned collaterally; the existence and amount of the debt of a petitioning
debtor in an involuntary bankruptcy. 147 U.S. 165, 173, 13 S.Ct. 271,
273, 37 L.Ed. 123, 126.
61. For example the exception of governmental immunity from suit. See
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 309 U.S. 506,
60 S.Ct. 653, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940), where the following question was at issue:
"Is a former judgment against the United States on a cross-claim in the
United States District Court, which was entered without statutory authority
and therefore without consent of the sovereign to be sued, fixing a balance
of indebtedness to be collected as provided by law, res judicata'in this liti-
gation for the collection of the balance?" The Court refused to apply resjudicata, saying, "The reasons for the conclusion that this immunity may not
be waived govern likewise the question of res judicata. . . . Public policy
forbids the suit unless consent is given, as clearly as public policy makesjurisdiction exclusive by declaration of legislative policy." 309 U.S. 506, 514,
60 S.Ct. 653, 657, 84 L.Ed. 894, 899.
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full faith and credit clause; whereas if it recognizes the judg-
ment, it is violating the due process clause. Certainly the two
should not be at odds.
It has long been settled that where there has been no con-
testation of the jurisdictional question, even though a recital
of jurisdiction is made in the record, a sister state may inquire
into the jurisdiction of the court rendering judgment without
thereby denying full faith and credit to that judgment. 2
It is also apparently established that where there has been
an appearance in an in personam proceeding, the jurisdictional
determination is res judicata and the courts of a sister state must
give full faith and credit without inquiring into the jurisdiction. 63
However, as explained earlier in this comment,64 the result in
these cases could never be a denial of due process, since in an
in personam proceeding, any appearance by the defendant,
though it be a special appearance, is at least a consent to the
jurisdiction of the court for determining the special plea.
It is yet more firmly embedded in our law that an in per-
sonam judgment rendered without valid service of process on
the defendant, or appearance of the defendant, is a violation of
due process of law and is null from its rendition. 5
The theory and public policy underlying the Pennoyer6
decision are elementary. A court without jurisdiction cannot
render a valid judgment, even though it declares that it does
have jurisdiction. If such were not the rule, our system of justice
would be paradoxical.
Whether the judgment be in personam or in rem, the under-
lying theory and public policy are the same. Jurisdiction in an
in personam proceeding is based on valid service of process or
appearance of the defendant; jurisdiction in an in rem proceed-
ing is based on control of the res by the court. If a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction in an in personam proceeding
violates due process, why does not a judgment rendered without
jurisdiction in an in rem proceeding violate due process? The
reply is as elementary as the question. It does. It did, that is, until
62.,Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457, 21 L.Ed. 897 (1873); Williams v.
North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942); Williams
v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 LEd. 1577 (1945).
63. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522, 51
S.Ct. 417, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931); Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 66 S.Ct. 853,
90 L.Ed. 970 (1946).
64. Supra p. 522 et seq.
65. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877).
66. Ibid.
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the Coe and Sherrer decisions. This is precisely the approach
adopted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent."7
It has been concluded that a divorce is an in rem proceed-
ing, that the marital res is the thing involved, and that the court
obtains control over this res through domicile of at least one of
the parties. Thus, domicile is an essential jurisdictional fact. The
appearance of the defendant cannot cure the absence of the
marital res. It seems, therefore, that res judicata was mistakenly
applied in the Coe and Sherrer cases and that consent of the
parties is not sufficient to bring the marital res before the court.
It would be appropriate at this point to re-emphasize the
distinction made between strictly jurisdictional and quasi-juris-
dictional facts.68 Without the former, the constitutional mandate
of due process is violated, and res judicata, a creature of the
common law, is no defense. Without the latter, due process is
not violated; and, therefore, res judicata is properly applied.
It was recognized in Bank of Jasper v. First National Bank
of Rome, Ga.6 9 that where the res is not within the control of the
court the judgment is void, and the special appearance of the
parties to contest jurisdiction does not make it valid. Res judi-
cata was not applied. This was an action in a federal district
court by the indorsee of certificates of deposit, who was a Georgia
domiciliary, against the maker bank at its domicile in Florida.
The defendant pleaded res judicata on the basis of a prior Florida
judgment declaring the certificate void. In the state court the
indorsee had appeared specially to contest the validity of the
constructive service. The United States Supreme Court refused
to apply res judicata: (1) since there was no general appear-
ance, there was no jurisdiction in personam; (2) since the res or
certificates of deposit were not within the control of the Florida
court, there was no jurisdiction in rem.
It is true that there was no general appearance by the de-
fendant as in the Coe and Sherrer cases.' It is also true that the
special appearance was for the purpose of contesting in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the defendant, and not in rem jurisdic-
tion. However, the opportunity to litigate all jurisdictional ele-
ments was present here just as in the Coe and Sherrer cases.
67. 334 U.S. 343, 356, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1097, 92 L.Ed. 1429, 1439 (1948).
68. See note 60, supra.
69. 258 U.S. 112, 42 S.Ct. 202, 66 L.Ed. 490 (1922). For considerations of
the possible conflict between res judicata as applied in the Coe and Sherrer
decisions and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see the
following comments (1947) 18 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 101, (1948) 36 Geo. L. J.
154, (1931) 31 Col. L. Rev. 238, (1935) 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 552, (1925) 24 Yale
L.J. 886.
1949]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Coe and Sherrer decisions have been relied upon in a
number of state cases.7 0 However, in only one such case, Jen-
nings v. Jennings7 1 is the due process limitation expressly recog-
nized. This case, involving only an intrastate divorce, raised no
problem of conflict of laws or full faith and credit. But if the
question of domicile is approached through the due process
channel, it should be immaterial whether the divorce is purely
intrastate or interstate. In this case neither the husband nor the
wife was a domiciliary of Alabama. Nevertheless, the wife was
suing the husband for divorce on the basis of an Alabama sta-
tute 2 which apparently allowed the suit. There was personal ap-
pearance of both parties and submission by defendant to the jur-
isdiction of the court. Despite this, the Alabama Supreme Court
declared that there was no jurisdiction, since there was no domi-
cile, saying, "domicile in the State gives the court jurisdiction
of the marital status or res which the court must have in order
to act. . . .Jurisdiction of the res is essential because the object
of a divorce action is to sever the bonds of matrimony, and unless
the marital status is before the court, the court cannot act on
that status. . . .Furthermore it is recognized that unless one
of the parties has a residence or domicile within the state, the
parties cannot even by consent confer jurisdiction on the courts
of that state to grant a divorce. '7 3 Insofar as the statute affected
divorces it was held void, since the legislature cannot confer
power on the courts which the state cannot confer on the legis-
lature.
The court in the Jennings case cited Williams v. North Caro-
lina, Bell v. Bell, Andrews v. Andrews, and Sherrer v. Sherrer.
The Sherrer case would seem to indicate, however, that under
these particular facts a consent decree would be valid (unless a
distinction can be drawn between a case where there is clearly
70. Ross v. Ross, 79 Fed. Supp. 716 (N.D. Cal. 1948); Jennings v. Jen-
nings, 36 So.(2d) 236 (Ala. 1948); Vickers v. State Bar of California, 196
P.(2d) 10 (Calif. 1948); Keller v. Keller, 212 S.W.(2d) 789 (Mo. 1948); Lage-
mann v. Lagemann, 196 P.(2d) 1018 (Nev. 1948); Jackson v. Jackson, 79
N.Y.S.(2d) 736, 274 App. Div. 43 (1948); Lynn v. Lynn, 82 N.Y.S.(2d) 397,
192 Misc. 720 (1948); Bane v. Bane, 80 N.Y.S.(2d) 641 (1948); deMarigny v.
deMarigny, 193 Misc. 189, 81 N.Y.S.(2d) 228 (1948); Kahn v. Kahn, 49 S.E.
(2d) 570 (S.C. 1948); Knox v. Knox, 199 P.(2d) 766 (Calif. 1948); Heard v.
Heard, 82 N.E.(2d) 219 (Mass. 1948); Lilienthal v. Lilienthal, 192 Misc. 1022,
83 N.Y.S. (2d) 71 (1948).
71. 36 So. (2d) 236 (Ala. 1948).
72. This statute required a bona fide residence by plaintiff of one year
where defendant was a non-resident, "provided, however, the provisions of
this section shall not be of force and effect when the court has jurisdiction
of both parties to the cause of action." Ala. Code (Supp. 1946) tit. 34, § 29.
73. Jennings v. Jennings, 36 So.(2d) 236, 237 (Ala. 1948).
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no domicile and one where it is questionable) even where there
was no actual domicile by either spouse. The Alabama court
went deeper than the Sherrer case. It looked to the jurisdiction
of the res and decided on the basis of due process (although due
process was not expressly mentioned) that the court did not
have jurisdiction over the intrastate divorce.
The decision in the Jennings case brings the problem, in its
most extreme form, into bold relief. Will the Supreme Court
follow the Coe and Sherrer decisions; will it expand them to in-
clude a situation like the Jennings case; or will it with the aid
of the due process clause draw the states into line in molding a
uniform divorce jurisprudence?
Conclusion
It is submitted that the utilization of the due process clause
would serve the interests of all parties with a minimum of fric-
tion. Under this theory, the states with more narrow divorce
laws could attack decrees granted in the "easy divorce states"
on strictly jurisdictional grounds, whether or not the issues had
been contested or adjudicated by the sister court. This should
be a satisfactory adjustment, since it partakes little of compro-
mise. It would only preclude a state from attacking quasi-juris-
dictional facts which had been adjudicated. This apparently has
been the law for a long time. Logically, the state not only could
but must attack a decree where there is no jurisdiction. If it
does not, due process will be violated.
The states with lenient divorce laws might voice vehement
opposition to this theory initially. But their position is none the
worse. It had always been the law, prior to the Coe and Sherrer
decisions, that domicile is essential to give jurisdiction to grant
a divorce. The states recognize this fundamental principle in
their statutes.
The individuals immediately concerned would profit. Al-
though the plaintiff in the divorce suit might be inconvenienced
somewhat if he were forced to establish an actual domicile, he
could nevertheless acquire it in the same short period, if he had
bona fide intention. The defendant would always be protected
by the due process remedy. Since this remedy is available in
every kind of state action, and since all else must bow to the
supremacy of the Constitution, the plaintiff is being deprived
of nothing that is his due.
1949]
534 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. IX
The federal government, together with the states and the
individuals, would be accomplishing through jurisprudence what
has heretofore been impossible to achieve through legislation-
greater uniformity in divorce recognition, and greater certainty
in divorced marital status.
VIRGINIA L. MARTIN
